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THE LEAK AND THE CRAFT:
A HARD LINE PROPOSAL TO STOP
UNACCOUNTABLE DISCLOSURES OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION
John Q. Barrett
INTRODUCTION

T

HE critics of Kenneth W. Starr accused him, in the five-plus years

that he served as the multi-tasked Independent Counsel,' of many

* Associate Professor, St. John's University School of Law. A.B., Georgetown
University, 1983; J.D., Harvard University, 1986. E-mail: jbarrett C-sjulawfac.
stjohns.edu. This Article expands upon my presentation as part of a June 5, 1999,
panel entitled "After Starr Wars, Part I: The Role and Responsibilities of the Public
Prosecutor," at the American Bar Association's Center for Professional Responsibility 25th National Conference. I am grateful to Mary Daly, Art Garwin, and Bruce
Green for their planning efforts and invitation, to Michael Simons, Brian Tamanaha,
and Sarah Walzer for very helpful comments, and to Karen R. Kowalski and Jean M.
Lucido for excellent research assistance.
1. "Whitewater" grossly understated the scope of Starr's jurisdiction, which was
regularly expanded during his years as Independent Counsel. In August 1994, Starr
was appointed to investigate the "Whitewater" real estate deal and related matters:
"whether any individuals or entities have committed a violation of any federal criminal law, other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction, relating in any way to
James B. McDougal's, President William Jefferson Clinton's, or Mrs. Hillary Rodham
Clinton's relationships with Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association [or]
Whitewater Development Corporation ... ." In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n
at 2 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Aug. 5, 1994) (order appointing Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr). Starr also, at that time, "inherited the wide-ranging work of [Department of Justice Special Prosecutor] Robert B. Fiske, Jr., whose Little Rock-based investigation included, among various other matters, the tax and bankruptcy fraud case
involving then-Governor Jim Guy Tucker and others." Office of the Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, August 18, 1999 (visited Oct. 20, 1999),
available on <http'//www.oicstarr.com>. On subsequent occasions, the panel of
judges that had appointed Starr granted Attorney General Reno's serial requests to
expand Starr's jurisdiction by assigning him to undertake the following additional
criminal investigations and, in his discretion, prosecutions:
(1) whether former Associate Attorney General Webster L Hubbell violated federal criminal law in his billing and expense practices while he was a
member of Arkansas' Rose Law Firm, as well as all other matters arising
from that investigation, see In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n at 2
(D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Sept. 1, 1994) (order expanding the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr);
(2) whether William David Watkins, a former Assistant to the President for
Management and Administration, violated federal criminal law in connection with his December 1993 General Accounting Office interview concern-
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failings, mistakes, and improprieties.2 One of the most prevalent
charges was one that has significance to lawyers and resonates with
the general public's sense of bad behavior by prosecutors: the allegation that Starr and/or members of his staff "leaked" information.'
This general accusation was, of course, imprecise. It also might
have been overbroad. Prosecutorial "leaks" include such plain illegalities as disclosing grand jury information to the media or other unauthorized persons,4 and also the much less regulated practice of reing the firing of White House Travel Office employees, as well as any other
false statements, obstructions of justice, or other crimes by other persons or
entities in matters related to or arising out of that investigation, see In re
Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Mar. 22, 1996)
(order expanding the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W.
Starr);
(3) whether Anthony Marceca, a detailee to the White House Office of Personnel Security, or any other person or entity violated federal criminal law in
connection with White House requests to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for background investigation reports and materials, as well as all other
matters arising from that investigation, see In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan
Ass'n at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. June 21, 1996) (order expanding the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr);
(4) whether former White House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum committed
perjury or violated any other federal criminal law in, and whether any other
person or entity engaged in an unlawful conspiracy or aided or abetted any
federal offense in connection with, his testimony before a House committee
on June 26, 1995, as well as all other matters arising from that investigation,
see In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Oct.
25, 1996) (order expanding the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth
W. Starr);
(5) whether Mr. Hubbell or any other person violated federal criminal law
in connection with his income since January 1, 1994, or his tax and other
debts to various levels of government or his former law firm, and whether
Hubbell or any other person or entity violated any federal criminal law in
connection with payments he received since that date, see In re Madison
Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n at 1 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Jan. 6, 1998) (order expanding the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr); and
(6) whether former White House intern Monica Lewinsky or other persons
violated federal criminal law in dealing with "witnesses, potential witnesses,
attorneys, or others concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton," In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n at 1-2 (D.C. Cir. Spec. Div. Jan. 16, 1998) (order expanding the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr).
These orders, which were unsealed by the appointing court at various times, are
available on Starr's office web site, Office of the Independent Counsel (visited Oct.
20, 1999) <http://www.oicstarr.com>. It also is possible that Starr was assigned to
conduct additional investigations that remain under court seal and have not, to date,
been publicized. On October 18, 1999, Starr tendered his resignation to the special
court that had appointed him in 1994. The court accepted Starr's resignation and simultaneously appointed one of his deputies, Robert W. Ray, to succeed Starr as independent counsel.
2. The mere existence of this Symposium, not to mention everything contained
therein, is authority for this proposition.
3. For the most savage and entertaining, but perhaps not the most plausible, version of this criticism of Starr, see James Carville, ... And The Horse He Rode In On:
The People v. Kenneth Starr 86-109 (1998).
4. See infra Part I.A.
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leasing non-public law enforcement information5 Although it may
turn out that Starr and/or members of his staff illegally disclosed
grand jury information, we already know-because we in the public
learned only much later, and through lawful processes that made the
information public, of grand jury secrets that Starr and his staff knew
at much earlier points in time but did not "leak" 6-that they did not
do so systematically. Indeed, Starr's Office of Independent Counsel
was one of technical-indeed,
perhaps overly technical-and very
7
competent legality.
On the precise topic of prosecutors and other office employees
talking about their work to outsiders, such as the media, Starr's office
often stated its commitment to adhere to all of the laws and general
policies against grand jury leaks and other undesirable information
disclosures that can be found in prosecutors' offices at every level of
government. For example, in an early press release, Starr emphatically announced that he would tolerate no improper disclosures of information by any member of his office staff:
A hallmark of this investigation from its inception has been that
there have been no unauthorized or improper disclosures of information. When I was appointed Independent Counsel, I adopted and
implemented a policy centralizing our contact with the press to assure that there would not be even inadvertent disclosures of information. I also received the assurance of each member of my staff
that he or she understands and will abide by this policy. I am certain
that these steps have worked and that they effectively have guarded
against the dissemination of information to people outside of the investigation ....

When I took my oath of office I pledged to conduct this investi5. See infra Part I.B.

6. One example of grand jury information that did not leak is the substance of
Hillary Clinton's January 1996 testimony before a Whitewater grand jury sitting in

Washington, D.C. Although we now know that Starr's deputy, Hickman Ewing, Jr.,
found Mrs. Clinton's testimony to be so incredible that he drafted a proposed indictment of her later in 1996, this information did not become public until Ewing was
subpoenaed to testify about perspectives and deliberations within Starr's office by defendant Susan McDougal during her criminal contempt trial-which was her second
prosecution by Starr's office-almost three years later. See, e.g., Pete Yost, Starr Aide
Tells of QuestioningClintons' Credibility,Wash. Post, Mar. 19,1999, at A10.
7. Apart from the leak allegations, Starr's legal adversaries and other lessinvested critics said that he was obsessed with legal technicalities and lacked the
judgment and broader sense of perspective that a better prosecutor would have
brought to his work. See, e.g., Laurie L Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The
Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 553, 559
(1999) (describing Starr's September 1998 referral to the House of Representatives of
potential impeachment information regarding President Clinton as "an example of a
prosecutorial approach that mechanically applies the facts of a case to possible
charges, rather than screening those charges through the use of prosecutorial discretion"). See generally Rory K. Little, Proportionalityas an Ethical Preceptfor Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 723 (1999) (finding that Starr

acted within the legal boundaries during his investigation).
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gation with objectivity, integrity and with due respect to the rights
and reputations of the individuals involved in, or affected by, the investigation. We have and will abide by all of the obligations imposed upon us to protect the integrity of the grand jury process and
our ethical obligations as professionals, including those requiring the
secrecy of our proceedings.8
Mr. Starr repeated this position in various ways over his years of
service.,
8. Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Oct. 20,
1994 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> (denying that his
office was among the "federal law enforcement sources" cited in an October 19, 1994,
Washington Times article concerning matters that Starr's office allegedly was investigating).
9. See, e.g., Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release,
Nov. 25, 1994 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("Secrecy has been and will continue to be a hallmark of this investigation. However, we
have no control over what may appear in the media based upon information obtained
from sources outside of the investigation and, consequently, we must not and will not
comment on the reports that have appeared this week."); Office of the Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, May 19, 1995 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("We have no control over what may appear in the
media based upon information obtained from sources outside of the investigation. As
we have stated previously, we have been and will continue to be bound by strict standards of secrecy."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Aug. 28, 1995 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com>
("It is the normal practice of the Office of the Independent Counsel not to comment
on any aspect of our investigation, including any reports which may appear in the media. A statement of 'no comment' neither affirms nor denies the substance of the
question posed. That will continue to be this Office's practice to ensure the integrity
and confidentiality of the investigation. Confidentiality has been and will continue to
be a hallmark of this investigation. However, we have no control over what may appear in the media based upon information obtained from sources outside of the investigation and, consequently, we must not and will not comment on those reports.");
Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Feb. 29, 1996
(visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("This Office has
adopted the professional practices of accountability of the United States Department
of Justice, which are consistent with the highest standards of professional conduct.
Our responsibility as prosecutors, and as representatives of the United States,
strongly discourages us from commenting on matters of substance regarding th[e
then-ongoing] trial [of James McDougal, Susan McDougal and then Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker]. It is important for advocates to confine their legal arguments
to the judge and jury, in accordance with the law."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Feb. 18, 1997 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), availableon
<http://www.oicstarr.com> ("We reaffirm that it is the normal practice of the Office
of the Independent Counsel not to comment on any aspect of our investigation, including reports which may appear in the media. A statement of 'no comment' neither
affirms nor denies the substance of the question posed. That will continue to be this
Office's general practice to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the investigation."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, June 25,
1997 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), availableon <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("Federal law and
traditional practice dictate that this process [of investigation] occur in secret, except
that witnesses are themselves free to speak out publicly. This Office thus has no control over what witnesses might say to the media, nor over any publicity that might result."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Jan. 21,
1998 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://www.oicstarr.com> ("Because of con-
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What the "leak" allegations were suggesting in their vague generalities was something more basic about Mr. Starr's personal conduct and
his supervision of the numerous, very serious federal criminal investigations that his office conducted. Starr and members of his office staff
plainly did, on numerous occasions over the years, talk to reporters in
detail about the thinking, the ongoing investigative work, the preliminary findings, the past and pending cases, and the possible next steps
of the Office of Independent Counsel. Some of this speech occurred
"on the record," which meant that the speakers were on broadcast
media or authorized print reporters to publish these statements as
verbatim quotations attributed to named persons. 0 Such statements
fidentiality requirements, we are unable to comment on any aspect of our work.");
Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, June 13, 1998
(visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <httpJ/wwvw.oicstarr.com> ("Steven Brill has
recklessly and irresponsibly charged the Office of Independent Counsel with improper contacts with the media. These charges are false.... The contacts between
the Office of the Independent Counsel and journalists have been legal, appropriate
and consistent with Department of Justice policy .... "); see also Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, July 18, 1995 (visited Oct. 20,
1999), available on <httpJ/www.oicstarr.com> ("The Office of the Independent

Counsel has not and will not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury to any-

one."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Sept. 7,
1996 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http://vww.oicstarr.com> ("As officers of
the Court pledged to preserve the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings and of matters currently under investigation, we are unable to fully respond to the comments
made by Susan H. McDougal and one of her attorneys, Bobby McDaniel, on national
television."); Office of the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release,
Jan. 24, 1998 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <httpJ/vww.oicstarr.com> ("[Any
information about grand jury subpoenas has been disclosed by the persons under
subpoena, their attorneys, or others outside the Office of the Independent Counsel.
No such information has been disclosed by anyone from this Office."); cf Office of
the Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Sept. 13, 1999 (visited
Oct. 20,1999), availableon <http://wwv.oicstarr.com> ("We are also gratified that the
Court of Appeals' unanimous decision provided the Chief Judge of the District Court
[for the District of Columbia] with necessary guidance in addressing challenges to
grand jury proceedings. Noting the important role of prosecutors providing public
information regarding criminal investigations, the Court of Appeals [for the District
of Columbia Circuit today] found that prosecutors' statements about their investigations are prohibited from disclosure only 'when they directly reveal grand jury matters.'... This Office has abided, and will continue to abide, by the rules regarding
grand jury secrecy.").
10. See e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Truth and Tnah-Telling, 30 Tex. Tech L Rev. 90107 (1999) (publishing Starr's May 10, 1998 speech at the Texas Tech University
School of Law in Lubbock, Texas); Ann W. O'Neill, StarrAdmits Bhmders in ClintonLewinsky Inquiry, LA. Times, Sept. 16, 1999, at Al (describing Starr's September 15,
1999 speech to 500 civic and business leaders at a lunch hosted by Town Hall Los Angeles, and his remarks later that day at a meeting with senior Los Angeles Times editors); Kenneth W. Starr, What We've Accomplished, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1999, at A26;
Mitch Webber, StarrDiscusses Independent Counsel Statute at YPU, Yale Daily News,
Sept. 10, 1999 (visited Sept. 22, 1999), available on <httpJ/vww.yaledailynes.coml
news/ArchivedArticle.asptype=live&AID=1865> (describing Starr's September 9,
1999 address to the Yale Political Union); Fox News Sunday (Fox television broadcast, June 13, 1999) (transcript available in LEXIS) (interviewing Starr); Nightline
(ABC television broadcast, Apr. 24, 1996) (transcript available in LEXIS) (reporting
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helped to advance public understanding of Starr's work, or at least his
and his staff's views of it. These statements and interviews also were
available in the sunlight to be evaluated as prosecutors' statements
about ongoing investigative and prosecutorial activity."
But not all of the statements and pieces of investigative information
that emanated from Starr's office were on the record and attributed to
named persons. At various times, Mr. Starr himself spoke, 2 and other
members of his staff seem to have spoken, 13 to reporters about their
work "on background" or "off the record.' 4 This conduct put inforStarr's answers to questions about his decision to continue representing private law
clients while also serving as independent counsel, and including an appearance by
Starr's former deputy, Mark Tuohey, who defended Starr and his office against various charges by another guest, James Carville); Independent Counsel Kenneth W.
Starr, Remarks at the University of Minnesota School of Law's United States v.
Nixon Symposium (Oct. 24, 1998) (transcript available in the Federal Document
Clearing House ("FDCH") Political Transcripts); Independent Counsel Kenneth W.
Starr, Remarks at the Mecklenberg Bar Foundation, Charlotte, North Carolina (June
1, 1998) (transcript available in the Federal News Service); Independent Counsel
Kenneth W. Starr, Address Before the San Antonio Bar Association Meeting (May 1,
1998) (transcript available in the Federal News Service) (reporting Starr's speech on
executive privilege); Susan McDougal Sentenced to Two Years by FederalTrial (CNN
television broadcast, Aug. 20, 1996) (transcript available in LEXIS) (broadcasting
Starr's press conference outside the federal courthouse in Little Rock, Arkansas);
Text of Whitewater Special Counsel's News Conference (CNN television broadcast,
June 22, 1995) (transcript availablein LEXIS) (broadcasting Starr's press conference
following the arraignment of then Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker); Today
Show: Part I: Ken Starr Discusses Investigation of PresidentBill Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 9, 1999) (transcript available in LEXIS); Today Show: Part II:
Ken StarrDiscusses Investigation of PresidentClinton and FirstLady (NBC television
broadcast, Aug. 10, 1999) (transcript available in LEXIS).
11. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Nominee Faces Questions But No Strong
Opposition, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1997, at 22 (quoting then-United States Attorney
and Deputy Attorney General-designate Eric H. Holder, Jr.'s testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee: "I don't personally have any problem with the [public]
pronouncements that Judge Starr has made.").
12 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Kenneth Starr, Trapped, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1997, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (reporting that "Starr provided background assistance for the article [about him] but declined to be quoted directly").
13. See Steven Brill, Pressgate,Brill's Content, Aug. 1998, at 122, 131-32. Brill
noted:
As a general matter, in response to an opening "Have you ever... ?" question, Starr hesitates, then acknowledges that he has often talked to various
reporters without allowing his name to be used and that his prime deputy,
Jackie Bennett, Jr., has been actively involved in 'briefing' reporters, especially after the Lewinsky story broke. "I have talked with reporters on
background on some occasions," he says, "but Jackie has been the primary
person involved in that. He has spent much of his time talking to individual
reporters."
Id.
14. According to one study of journalistic ethics, written by a former reporter who
had become a journalism professor, "off the record" does not even have a single
meaning in the world of journalism. "Depending on the customs of the city and the
reporter's previous dealings with a particular source, it [speaking 'off the record'] may
mean promising not to use the information obtained at all, or to use the information
only indirectly, or not to attribute the information to the source." Bruce M. Swain,
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mation into the public domain without the accountability that comes
from seeing, reading, or at least knowing who deployed it.
Starr's decision to speak, and apparently to authorize his subordinates to speak, other than on the record was a choice. It was a policy

decision by the person who was, within his areas of jurisdiction, the

senior law enforcement official in the United States government.5 In
the future, Starr's successor senior federal prosecutors should reconsider that decision and, in my view, decide to take a very different
course.
This Article explores what that course should look like. Part I de-

fines and analyzes the two types of information-grand jury secrets
and law enforcement information-that Independent Counsel Starr
"leaked" according to the allegations that plagued his investigation.
Part II examines the various restrictions on a prosecutor's ability to
disclose law enforcement information. Finally, Part III sets out strict
guidelines, characterized by accountability, professionalism, and uniformity, for the disclosure of law enforcement information by the government.
I.

THE "LEAK" ALLEGATIONS AGAINST INDEPENDENT COUNSEL

STARR

From 1994 through 1999, Independent Counsel Starr and his staff
were accused of two very different kinds of leaking. One species of
leak, plainly illegal, is disclosing grand jury information to anyone
Reporters' Ethics 47 (1978). Indeed, Washington, D.C., the site of much of Starr's
investigative activity and much of his office's alleged leaking, has been described as "a
city with whole hierarchies of terminology for off-the-record material: background,
deep background, and deep deep background, government sources, high official
sources, and White House sources." Id. at 48-49.
How do I know that people in Starr's office gave information to reporters on background or off-the-record? As a general matter, it was obvious in the press coverage
of Starr's investigation. Press reports at various points contained unattributed information about evidence, strategy, or "thinking" inside Starr's office that, if reporters
were not simply making it up (and I do not believe that many reporters make things
up wholesale), could have come only from someone with inside knowledge of the Office of Independent Counsel. More directly, as I received telephone calls from reporters seeking my comments during 1998 and 1999 about the Independent Counsel
Law and various developments in Starr's investigations of President Clinton, Monica
Lewinsky, and others, some reporters would flat out tell me-perhaps in violation of
their own professional ethics, but that is beyond the scope of what I am addressing in
this Article-that they were receiving lots of inside information from Starr's office.
My general impression is that this happened five to ten times. In some of these instances, later public disclosures, including on-the-record statements by Star and his
associates, confirmed the accuracy of what the reporters had told me earlier that they
had learned in some kind of confidence from Starr's office.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994). See generally John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or
Maybe Cooperation." Attorney General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to
the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 519,524-27 (1998) (describing
how the independent counsel law reallocated powers from the Department of Justice
("DOJ") to any independent counsel appointed under its provisions).
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who is not authorized by law to receive it.16 The other species of
"leak," proscribed by no federal statute or regulation and generally
permitted by the customs of federal law enforcement, is sharing nonpublic, but non-grand jury, information with friends, political supporters, and selected reporters. 7
A.

Leak Type 1: GrandJury Secrets

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), a procedural rule that has
the force of any substantive federal statute,'8 protects the secrecy of
"matters occurring before" federal grand juries. 19 Although there is
significant definitional dispute and divided case law on the question of
what constitutes a "matter" occurring before a federal grand jury,20 the
protection defined by Rule 6(e) certainly includes, at its core, verbatim accounts of witness testimony to federal grand juries.21 Rule 6(e)

makes it a crime, subject to prosecution for criminal contempt and
other charges, for any federal prosecutor, or for any prosecutor's nonlawyer colleague who is authorized under Rule 6(e) to receive grand
jury information, to reveal any grand jury secrets to any unauthorized
person.?
In the case of Independent Counsel Starr, much of what we know
about his grand jury investigations comes from disclosures that plainly
were not violations of Rule 6(e) by him or his staff. Some of the
leading sources of public information about what transpired before
Starr's grand juries were, on the record or indirectly, talkative grand
jury witnesses themselves, along with their friends, attorneys, spokespersons, and political supporters. Each of these persons is, of course,
not restricted by the prohibitions of Rule 6(e). Other disclosures of
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.B.
18. See 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 21 (2d ed. 1999);
3A Charles Allen Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 871-74 (2d ed. 1982 &
Supp. 1999).
19. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e).
20. See generally Sara Sun Beale et al., Grand Jury Law & Practice § 5.06 (2d ed.

1998) (citing numerous decisions and other authorities); Howard W. Goldstein,
Grand Jury Practice § 3.04[2], at 3-44 to 3-49 & nn.84-100 (1998) (same); Daniel C.
Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 Am. Crim.

L. Rev. 339, 340-41 (1999) (same). In the District of Columbia Circuit, however, the
federal Court of Appeals recently clarified-in its decision exonerating the Office of
Independent Counsel Starr on a particular charge that it had leaked grand jury information-that Rule 6(e)'s secrecy rule regarding "matters occurring before the grand
jury" refers literally and narrowly only to those matters, and not to prosecutors' nongrand jury investigations or their personal thought processes. See In re Sealed Case
No. 99-3091 (Office of Independent Counsel Contempt Proceeding), 1999 WL
709977, at *5-*9 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (per curiam).
21. See Goldstein, supra note 20, § 3.04[2], at 3-42 & n.76 (citing decisions).
22. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2). Rule 6(e) also itemizes specific circumstances in
which a person who otherwise would be subject to this prohibition may disclose matters occurring before a federal grand jury. See id. Rule 6(e)(3).
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grand jury information came directly from Starr himself, but through
processes that conformed to Rule 6(e). The most notable example of
these disclosures is Starr's statutorily-required23 and court-authorized4
1998 transmissions to the House of Representatives of grand jury and

other information that led to the impeachment of President Clinton.6
Other scraps of grand jury-related information reached the public
domain through processes that cannot fairly be blamed on Starr or his
staff . 6

None of these disclosures negates the possibility that Starr or some
other person on his staff-an attorney, a law enforcement agent, a
consultant, or a worker in a support position-violated the Rule 6(e)
prohibition. In early 1998, the private attorneys who were representing President Clinton, Mrs. Clinton, and other White House aides to
the President filed complaints to that effect in the United States Dis23. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994).
24. See In re Madison Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, Div. No. 94-1 (D.C. Cir. Spec.
Div. July 7, 1998) (per curiam) (filed under seal) (order authorizing Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to deliver to the House of Representatives materials, including disclosures before the grand jury, constituting information of the type described in 28 U.S.C. § 595(c)), reprintedin Office of the Independent Counsel, Referral to the United States House of Representatives Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c),
H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, app., pt. 1, tab B, at 10 (2d Sess. 1998) [hereinafter Starr Report].
25. See Starr Report, supra note 24. It was the House, not Starr, that summarily
released this information in toto to the public-to Starr's great surprise and enduring
consternation. See Testimony of Kenneth W. Starr before the House Judiciary Committee, Nov. 19, 1998, at 14, available in the FDCH Congressional Testimony on
LEXIS (testifying that "the public disclosure or nondisclosure of the referral and the
backup materials was a decision our office did not make-and lawfully could not
make"); Today Show: Part I: Ken Starr Discusses His Interview of President Bill
Clinton (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 9, 1999) (transcript available in LEXS)
(broadcasting Starr's explanation a year after the event that "[wle made nothing public. We sent the information [contained in his impeachment referral] to the Congress
of the United States, and the Congress, for better or worse, chose to make this public
in an extraordinary way, including putting it on the Internet and the like, without any
screening.... I was horrified.... I genuinely did [expect them to read it first]. It
never occurred to me that-that they wouldn't."). But cf. Michael Isikoff, Uncovering
Clinton: A Reporter's Story 353 (1999) (describing Starr's decision, after he learned
that the House of Representatives planned to release publicly his impeachment referral, not to send Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich a staff-drafted letter warning
that the referral "included 'highly explicit' material that is 'almost certainly inappropriate for wide public dissemination"').
26. In March 1999, for example, Ms. Freda Alexander, the foreperson of the
Washington, D.C. grand jury to which Starr's office had presented evidence in its investigation of President Clinton, Monica Lewinsky, and others in 1998, spoke on the
record to reporters about that work, apparently because she misunderstood private
legal advice she received about suing a former employer who had, she claimed, discharged her for missing work while she was serving as a grand juror. See Susan B.
Glasser, Forewoman Would Have Voted To Indict Clinton: Grand Jury Leader in
Lewinsky Probe Breaks Secrecy, Says PresidentLied, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1999, at
Al; see also Grand Jury Forewoman Now Silent, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1999, at A3
(reporting a meeting between Starr and Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia about this matter).
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trict Court for the District of Columbia, a venue where Staff's office
presented evidence to some of the federal grand juries that played
roles in his investigations?2 Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson
subsequently determined that these litigants had identified at least
twenty-four media reports in 1998 that were prima facie evidence of
Rule 6(e) violations by Starr's officen and appointed a Special Master
to investigate.2 This "leaks" investigation reportedly has exonerated
Starr and his staff, but it appears that the court has not formally concluded its investigation as of fall 1999.
Although outsiders know little about the Special Master's investigation, it will not be surprising if this investigation concludes that Starr
and his staff committed no clear violation of Rule 6(e). At the level of
27. See Dan Balz, White House Advisers Agree: Attack Starr, Wash. Post, Feb. 7,
1998, at Al (reporting that Kendall made his statement at a televised press conference); Kendall: "A Deluge of Illegal Leaks," Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1998, at A13 (quoting
Kendall's public statement about "a deluge of illegal leaks from [Starr's] office of
false and misleading information" and announcing his intention "to seek ...court appropriate remedies including contempt sanctions"); Portions of a Letter from Clinton
Lawyer to Independent Counsel, Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 1998, at A6 (quoting "a major
portion" of a letter from David E. Kendall, President Clinton's personal attorney, to
Independent Counsel Starr, which complained that "[tlhe covert dissemination of
both accurate and inaccurate information by [his] staff violates Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, case law, Department of Justice Guidelines, rules
of court and well-established ethical prohibitions" and listed dozens of specific examples of press reporting that allegedly reflected these leaks).
28. Contrary to much of the contemporaneous press reporting, which asserted
that there had been some kind of judicial finding that Starr had violated Rule 6(e),
this decision meant only that President Clinton's counsel had filed discrete and intelligible allegations to this effect that were sufficient to shift the burden of proving nonviolation to Starr. See Barry v. United States, 865 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
See generally Judge Patricia M. Wald, A Whitewater Legacy: Running the Rapids of
Constitutional Law, The Leslie H. Arps Memorial Lecture, Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (Oct. 26, 1999) (stating that this decision was "widely but
wrongly hailed" as proving the truth of allegations that Starr had leaked grand jury
information).
29. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-228, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290, at
*12 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1998) (Johnson, C.J.) (redacted version of opinion); see also Bill
Miller, Starr Tried to Limit Leak Probe, Keep It Secret, Wash. Post, Jan. 7, 1999, at
A26 (identifying District of Columbia Court of Appeals Senior Judge John W. Kern,
III, as the Special Master who Chief Judge Johnson appointed on September 25, 1998,
to determine whether personnel in Starr's office were the sources for 24 media reports
that constituted prima facie violations of Rule 6(e)). See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 53
(authorizing court appointments of special masters).
30. See Jerry Seper, Secret Report to Court Clears Starr, Staff of Illegal Leaking,
Wash. Times, Sept. 16, 1999, at A3 (quoting as the source for this report "a lawyer"
who is "not a current or former member of the independent counsel's office" and
"who has not read the document [Special Master Kern's report] but is familiar with its
contents"); see also ClearingKen Starr,Editorial, Wash. Times, Sept. 17, 1999, at A18
(editorializing that "sources familiar with Judge Kern's secret report told this newspaper's Jerry Seper that the charges against Mr. Starr were found to be entirely without merit"). Interestingly, as of early November 1999, no newspaper other than The
Washington Times has reported on whether Special Master Kern has submitted to
Chief Judge Johnson a report concerning the alleged leaks of grand jury information
by Starr and/or his staff.

1999]

THE LEAK AND THE CRAFT

office policy and group knowledge, I have a hard time believing that
so many responsible and well-regarded persons would have stooped to
such obvious and serious law breaking, or that not even one whistleblower would have come forward at some point if they had. I suspect
that what may have happened, instead, is that one Starr staff member
at a time-acting individually, in private, without seeking anyone's
authorization, and under great stress (some of it caused by the unfair
and inaccurate media criticism that the office was receiving)-spoke
in confidence to one reporter at a time about selected aspects of the
Office's investigative work and did not pause to consider whether they
were revealing Rule 6(e) grand jury secrets?1 I am guessing, in other
words, that any leakers in Starr's office were solo operators whose
colleagues did not really witness their misconduct.
If my supposition is correct that "Starr's" leaks of grand jury information actually were isolated instances of misconduct by separate individuals not acting in concert, it will be very unusual if the Special
Master or any leaks investigator succeeds in proving that such misconduct occurred. Leaks investigations generally seem not to succeed,
even when someone is in fact culpable for making a prohibited disclosure of information.Y First of all, the reporters who receive leaks al31. Cf. David Grann, Background Noise, New Republic, June 28, 1999, at 18, 22
(reporting that when three of Starr's senior staff prosecutors found evidence that a
colleague had misrepresented to their own internal leaks investigation his contacts
with a reporter in connection with a particular story that did not disclose matters occurring before a grand jury, they drove to the colleague's home and confronted him).
32. See, e.g., Lou Cannon, Justice Probe Fails to Disclose Source of Leaks on
Mideast,Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1983, at Al (reporting the closure, without success in
determining the source or the damage to national security, of "[a]n extensive Department of Justice investigation" that President Reagan had ordered "into purported
unauthorized disclosures of U.S. military and diplomatic strategy in Lebanon ....
'There is no evidence that reporters were told anything we didn't want them to know,'
one official said."); Jay Croft, 2 Reporters Jailed in Jewell Suit, Alt.-J. Const., June 4,
1999, at D1 (noting that the reporters involved in Richard Jewell's defamation suit
refuse to reveal their sources for their story despite a judge's order); Helen Dewar,
Senate Probe Fails to Identify Leakers: Sources in Hill-Thomas, "Keating Five" Cases
Elude Special Counsel, Wash. Post, May 6, 1992, at A3 [hereinafter Dewar, Senate
Probe] (reporting United States Senate Special Counsel Peter E. Fleming, Jr.'s final
report that he was unable to identify the sources who provided to reporters either
Professor Anita Hill's October 1991 written statement regarding then Supreme Court
nominee Judge Clarence Thomas or various pieces of information concerning the
Senate Ethics Committee investigation of five Senators' dealings with former savings
and loan executive Charles Keating); Ronald K. Noble, How Not to Investigate a
Leak, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1998, at A29 (stating that the Department of Justice, after
a comprehensive investigative effort, "failed to identify the source of the leak" that
led to a 1989 CBS television report that then Representative William H. Gray m was
the focus of a criminal investigation); cf. Roberto Suro, Judges Get Involved in Probe
of Starr: Reno Investigation Could Be Halted, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1999, at Al (reporting that, according to Department of Justice officials, Attorney General Reno
authorized an unusually aggressive internal inquiry to find and punish the sources of
news stories about her handling of [misconduct] allegations against Starr"). See generally Timothy J. Burger, PublicIntegrity Chief UnderFire, Legal Tunes, Dec. 15, 1997,
at 4 (reporting statement by Jane Kirtley, executive director of the Reporters' Com-
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most never give up their sources.33 Leak investigators know this and,
if they also understand the value of free and aggressive reporting in a
constitutional democracyM they tend not even to ask reporters, much
less seek to enforce subpoenas that might compel them to describe,
who told them what and when.35 This reliable silence by reporters
must in turn give government leakers great confidence that their con-

tacts will not give them up. Thus, the leakers also seem generally to
tough it out by offering false denials. Finally, leak investigators shy
away from polygraph examinations and other investigative methods
36
that might identify leakers or move them to admit their misconduct.
There is a further problem in leak investigations that is particular to
leaks of grand jury information. As noted above, Rule 6(e) and the
case law interpreting it are quite unclear about exactly what kinds of
disclosures it prohibits. 37 A disclosure of actual grand jury testimony
would clearly be illegal, but in Starr's case, no such information from
any of his grand jury investigations has appeared in media in a form
that suggests it came from such a blatantly illegal disclosure.3 Beyond
mittee for Freedom of the Press, that President Clinton or other top officials of his
administration "have criticized or called for probes of various leaks, and not[ing] that
these generally produced nothing," and quoting Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Louis Freeh's remark that, although leak probes are conducted "'by the dozens... [u]nfortunately, few of them are resolved'); Richard Harwood, Washington's
Way With a Leak, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1998, at A27 (noting that Starr responded to
Clinton attorney David Kendall's February 1998 call for a "grand jury leaks" investigation by echoing that call, and by dispatching FBI agents to investigate, but commenting that "whether he [Starr] can direct or supervise an investigation of his own
operation that would be seen to be credible is doubtful. If history is any guide, it also
will be fruitless, and the leakers will never be found.").
33. See Swain, supra note 14, at 52 (declaring that, as a matter of reporters' ethics,
"[o]nce [they] have taken information off the record, they are obligated-by personal
honor, the traditions of their craft, and a pragmatic desire to preserve reputations of
trustworthiness, but certainly not by law-never to reveal the identity of the source").
34. See, e.g., Noble, supra note 32 (stating that "the Justice Department has long
recognized the nexus between a news reporter's ability to protect [a] confidential
source and our country's ability to maintain a free press"). See generally United States
Dep't of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 1-7.112 ("Need for Free Press
and Public Trial").
35. See, e.g., Noble, supra note 32 (describing the DOJ decision, in its 1989 investigation that sought to determine whether any Department employee was responsible
for a press report regarding then-Representative William H. Gray III, not to subpoena CBS reporter Rita Braver); cf. Helen Dewar, Leak Investigator Backs Down
on Phone Subpoenas,Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1992, at A4 (describing Fleming's decision
to permit reporters, through counsel, to object to the Senate Rules and Administration Committee regarding Fleming's subpoenas seeking telephone company records
of certain calls by the reporters); Dewar, Senate Probe,supra note 32 (describing the
Senate sustaining reporters' objections to subpoenas they received from Senate Special Counsel Peter Fleming during his leaks investigation).
36. But see Noble, supra note 32 (describing the polygraph examinations, sworn
statements, and other investigative methods that the DOJ employed in its 1989 leaks
investigation concerning the CBS story about then-Representative Gray).
37. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
38. None of the media reports that Chief Judge Johnson found to be prima facie

1999]

THE LEAK AND THE CRAFT

the fairly narrow category of grand jury testimony leaking, it is unclear what Rule 6(e) encompasses. In his well-noted April 15, 1998,
interview with Steven Brill,3 Starr voiced the narrow interpretation

that Rule 6(e) does not encompass the pre-grand jury statements of
witnesses who later may testify before a grand jury.43 This view may
not be commendable, but it is not inconsistent with the statements and
conduct of numerous Department of Justice ("DOJ") prosecutors."1 It
will be surprising if a federal appellate court, at the end of the substantive litigation over grand jury secrecy in the context of Starr's investigations, holds plainly and directly that Starr's reading of Rule
6(e) is incorrect and illegal.
B.

Leak Type 2: Law Enforcement Information

Leaks of grand jury testimony itself are, of course, the easiest leaks
to identify. If an investigator with the powers of federal law enforcement is determined to interrogate the prosecutors and other persons
who had access to grand jury testimony that leaked, such leaks also
should be the easiest ones to trace back to a limited number of possible sources.
Beyond the core area that is defined by the rules of grand jury secrecy, however, there is a wealth of non-grand jury information that
law enforcement personnel possess and, when it suits some purpose to
do so, share with the media.2 In Starr's case, without belaboring the

evidence that someone in Starr's office violated Rule 6(e) is a quotation from or a description of actual grand jury testimony. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98228, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290, at *10-*33 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1998) (order to show
cause) (Johnson, CJ.) (redacted version of opinion) (listing the 24 media reports that,
in the Court's view, are prima facie evidence that someone in Starr's office violated
Rule 6(e)).
39. See Brill, supra note 13, at 122.
40. See id. at 132 ("Well, it is definitely not grand jury information, if you are
talking about what witnesses tell FBI agents or us before they testify before the grand
jury or about related matters," he [Starr] replies. "So, it's not 6-E.") (emphasis in

original).

41. See In re Sealed Case, No. 99-3091 (Office of Independent Counsel Contempt
Proceeding), 1999 WL 709977 at *5 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (stating that the DOJ
had, as amicus curiae in this litigation, "generally support[ed]" Independent Counsel
Starr's position, which the Court upheld, regarding the "coverage" of Rule 6(e)).
42. See Robert Reno, Starr's Loose Lips Don't Sink Ships, Just Our Confidence,
Newsday, June 17, 1998, at A51 (according to syndicated columnist who is the brother
of Attorney General Janet Reno: "Basically, here's how it works, folks. There are
more than 3,000 state and federal prosecutors in America .... [Q]uite a number of
them are gushing faucets who know exactly how to play selective footsie with the media in ways that make each of their jobs easier."); see, eg., Robert E. Precht, We Have
Seen The Enemy: Scenes From A Trial, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 539, 545 & nn.42-43
(1999) (describing how press reports prior to trial in the World Trade Center bombing
trial said that the government had located a gas station attendant who recalled
pumping gas into a yellow Ryder van driven by defendant Mohammed Salameh after
he had reported it stolen and a few hours before the explosion) (citing Mary B.V.
Tabor, Witnesses Report Seeing Suspects on Eve of Blast, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1993,
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details here, there consistently were abundant disclosures to media,
regarding "Whitewater" and all the other matters within Starr's constellation of jurisdiction, by sources who obviously were members of
federal law enforcement. These disclosures began in 1993-when Mr.
Starr was still in private practice and well-regarded by persons who
spanned the political spectrum-as the DOJ was considering criminal
referrals from the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") regarding
James McDougal, Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan, and James and
Susan McDougal's real estate and other dealings through the years
with Bill and Hillary Clinton.43 These disclosures continued in 1994
after Attorney General Reno had appointed Robert B. Fiske, Jr. to
investigate Whitewater matters as a special and independent prosecuat B4 (attributing the report to unnamed "Federal officials" and "Federal investigators") and Peg Tyre, Feds: Salameh Drove Bomb Van, Newsday, Mar. 24, 1993, at 3
(quoting "New Jersey FBI Director James Esposito" in the story but attributing only
to "[s]ources" the information about what "a witness told federal agents")); Jerry
Capeci & Gene Mustain, Jailed Gotti Isn't Crying 'Uncle,' N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 4,
1999, at 3 (reporting allegations by John J. Gotti's attorney that the federal government leaked videotapes of Gotti's conversations with visitors at the federal prison in
Marion, Illinois, to embarrass him); Warren Wilson, Microsoft's Gates Hissed, But
Herbold Whistles Back, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 15, 1998, at Cl (reporting
statement by Microsoft Executive Vice President Bob Herbold that, as its antitrust
suit against Microsoft was about to commence, the federal government leaked "damaging but one-sided 'snippets' of information" about Microsoft to generate negative
publicity about the company). See generally Eric H. Holder, Jr. & Kevin A. Ohison,
Dealing with the Media in High-Profile White Collar Crime Cases: The Prosecutor's
Dilemma, in White Collar Crime, at B-1 (1995) (discussing prosecutor cooperation
with media and the guidance provided to prosecutors by DOJ media policy); Doyle
McManus et al., Learning Curve Hits Independent Counsel, L.A. Times, June 17,
1998, at Al (quoting former Carter Administration DOJ official Terrence B. Adamson: "Providing background [briefings] is something that prosecutors have done for a
long time."). But see Frank A. Aukofer, Babbitt Likely Will Be Cleared: Report Says
Interior Secretary's Role in Casino Issue is Being Investigated by Counsel, Milwaukee
J.-Sentinel, Aug. 12, 1999, at 3 (quoting Michael Gauldin, spokesman for Secretary of
the Interior Bruce Babbitt, regarding Independent Counsel Carol Elder Bruce's 19981999 investigation of Mr. Babbitt: "She conducted a very thorough and professional
investigation without a lot of the confrontationalism and leaking that have been the
hallmark of other independent counsels.").
43. For example, Susan Schmidt and Michael Isikoff reported:
The RTC, according to documents and interviews with sources familiar with
the probe, told federal prosecutors more than a year ago that Bill and Hillary Clinton and other principals in a dozen corporations doing business with
Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan during the mid-1980s could possibly
have benefited from [an] alleged [check-kiting] scheme [to drain funds from
the thrift], though there is no evidence they had direct knowledge of it.
Susan Schmidt & Michael Isikoff, Dealings of Clinton PartnersWere Referred to Justice Dept. in 1992, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1993, at A3. Although sources for this reporting were of course not identified, the tenor of the story suggested that they were
employees of the Resolution Trust Corporation, not the Department of Justice. But
see Susan Schmidt & Michael Isikoff, Arkansas Probe Sensitive From Start: Investigation of Collapsed S&L Affected by Links With the Clintons, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1994,
at Al (chronicling "[t]he history of the Madison investigation, pieced together from
interviews with Justice Department and RTC officials along with documents from the
case").
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tor within the DOJ.44 Disclosures continued after the independent
counsel law was enacted later that year and Reno triggered it in the
Whitewater, Vincent Foster, and Webster Hubbell matters, resulting
in the appointment of Independent Counsel Starr.-, These disclosures
continued from 1994 to
1998 as Starr was assigned to investigate nu6
merous other matters.4
II. PROSECUTORS' ABILITY TO DISCLOSE LAW ENFORCEMENT
INFORMATION

The disclosures of non-grand jury law enforcement information that
flowed from Starr's office are typical of what federal law enforcement
sources give to the media in criminal investigations, and certainly in
criminal investigations that involve public officials or other persons
and events of notoriety, throughout the country." In this part, I will
describe how this is possible by considering the relative absence of restrictions on the government's ability to engage in this kind of talking
and revealing about people and matters it is investigating by methods
other than the grand jury.
A.

Rule 6(e)

The rule of grand jury secrecy is a limited restriction on the ability
of law enforcement personnel to disclose information. Rule 6(e) is, as
described earlier, not a broad prohibition and it is not easy to en-

44. See, e.g., Susan Schmidt, '84 Clinton Panel Names as a Suspect: RTC Asks
Fiske to Probe Whether $60,500 in S&L Funds Was Diverted, Wash. Post, Apr. 2,
1994, at Al (reporting that RTC investigators in 1993 named the 1984 Clinton gubernatorial campaign as a suspect in their criminal investigation of Madison Guaranty
Savings & Loan, and that 10 of RTC's criminal referrals to the DOJ regarding Madison were forwarded to special prosecutor Fiske). Although this reporting also did not
identify its sources, the tenor of the story again suggested that they were RTC, and
not DOJ (including Mr. Fiske's office), employees.
45. See e.g., Ellen Joan Pollock, Starr Takes Over Whitewater Probe as Decisions
Must Be Reached on Batch of Possible Indictments, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1994, at A14
(reporting, according to unnamed "lawyers involved in the investigation," that Starr
had "substantial documentary evidence" showing that Webster Hubbell had billed
personal expenses to his former law firm and soon could seek his indictment on mail
fraud and other charges, and that Hubbell's "attorney declined to comment").
46. See, eg., Bob Woodward, Shadow. Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate 398 (1999) ("The media stories about the Lewinsky matter were obviously coming, at least in part, from Starr's office."). But see William Raspberry, Just Two Questions, Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1998, at A21 (quoting a letter from Starr to Kendall:
"When you look at the information that we had in our office, and [at] the FBI, as opposed to information that you had access to, it [the former] never entered the public
domain." He [Starr] mentioned specifically the celebrated blue dress with its DNA
secrets. "Those were never in the public domain because you did not have a witness
in your joint defense arrangements whom you could debrief.") (first two sets alterations in original) (emphasis in original).
47. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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force. 4s Although it does apply more directly to investigations, such as
public corruption investigations, that are conducted more before
grand juries and through their compulsory processes than drug and
other street crime investigations, which law enforcement agents tend
to develop outside the grand jury context,49 Rule 6(e) simply is not the
all-encompassing limit on government disclosures of information that
criminal defense attorneys claim it to be.n
B.

Departmentof Justice Regulations

Beyond Rule 6(e), the policies of the DOJ also are not, as restrictions on information dissemination go, very restrictive or demanding.
The DOJ's formal regulations in this area, which generally apply to
court-appointed independent counsel who were or are in operation
under the independent counsel law,5' are filled with generalities. In
the context of indicted criminal cases and filed civil proceedings, the
DOJ recognizes both the patent impropriety of releasing information
"for the purpose of influencing a trial"52 and the existence of "valid
reasons for making available
to the public information about the ad''53
ministration of the law.
How should one, in the words of the regulations themselves,
"strik[e] a fair balance" between these competing values?m The DOJ
candidly admits that finding this balance "depends largely on the exercise of sound judgment" by DOJ personnel and by representatives
of the media.55 The regulations do not presume to coach the media on
how to behave. For DOJ personnel, however, the regulations contain
"Guidelines" that apply to releases of information from the time a
person becomes the subject of a criminal investigation until any resulting proceeding is terminated by trial or otherwise.56 These guidelines define safe harbors (types of information that DOJ personnel
generally may disseminate) 57 and rocky shoals (types of information
48. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
49. See Richman, supra note 20, at 342-45.
50. Professor Richman exaggerated only a little when he described the focus on

grand jury secrecy as a project in "Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket." Id. at
339.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(0(1) (1994).

52. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(a)(2) (1998).
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. See id. § 50.2(b).
57. See id. § 50.2(b)(3)(i)-(iv) (authorizing DOJ personnel, subject to "specific
limitations imposed by law or court rule or order," to "make public" a "defendant's

name, age, residence, employment, marital status, and similar background information," "[t]he substance or text of the charge," "[tihe identity of the investigating
and/or arresting agency and the length or scope of an investigation," and "circumstances immediately surrounding an arrest"). The regulation also directs, however,
that where releasing such information would be "highly prejudicial" or "serve no law
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that they should not release).s The regulations also plainly state that
senior officials can and will, in specific circumstances, make ad hoc
decisions about what information to release."
The DOJ's internal rulebook for prosecutors, The United States
Attorney's Manual, contains further policy guidance in this area.
While potentially criminal matters are under investigation but have
not yet been indicted, the Manual flatly prohibits "components and
personnel of the Department" from "respond[ing] to questions about
the existence of an ongoing investigation or comment[ing] on its nature or progress, including such things as the issuance or serving of a
subpoena, prior to the public filing of the document."' The very next
subsection of the Manual, however, defines the following exceptions
to this duty:
In matters that have already received substantial publicity, or about
which the community needs to be reassured that the appropriate law
enforcement agency is investigating the incident, or where release of

information is necessary to protect the public interest, safety, or welfare, comments about or confirmation of an ongoing investigation
may need to be made. In these unusual circumstances, the involved
investigative agency will consult and obtain approval from the
United States Attorney or Department Division handling the matter

prior to disseminating any information to the media.61
These statements encompass the substance of the policy guidance
and constitute the only formally codified restraints on federal law enforcement personnel within the DOJ today. Thus, at least as a floor,
they are the policy within any DOJ component or any office of independent counsel. It amounts to a system where, in dealing with media
and responding to inquiries, each United States Attorney, the Assisenforcement function," it "should not be made public." Id. § 50.2(b)(3)(iv).
5& See id. § 50.2(b)(6)(i)-(vi) (specifying "[o]bservations about a defendant's
character," "[sitatements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attributable to a defendant, or the refusal or failure of the accused to make a statement;" references to "investigative procedures... or to the refusal by the defendant to submit to such tests or
examinations;" "[s]tatements concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses;" "[s]tatements concerning evidence or argument in the case;" and
"[a]ny opinion as to the accused's guilt, or the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged [or] ... a lesser offense").
59. See id. § 50.2(b)(9) The Code states:
Since the purpose of this statement is to set forth generally applicable guidelines, there will, of course, be situations in which it will limit the release of
information which would not be prejudicial under the particular circumstances. If a representative of the DOJ believes that in the interest of the
fair administration of justice and the law enforcement process information
beyond these guidelines should be released, in a particular case, he shall request the permission of the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General to do so.
Id.
60. U. S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorney's Manual § 1.7-530(a).
61. Id. § 1-7.530(b).
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tant Attorney General who heads the Criminal Division (along with
the Main Justice officials above them, up to and including the Attor-

ney General herself), and each Independent Counsel has blanket
permission to determine that "the public interest,62safety or welfare"
requires the release of non-grand jury information.
In some instances, the determination whether to release investigative information has been made, formally or informally, as the DOJ's
regulations and The United States Attorney's Manual envision: with
permission from an official at the United States Attorney level or

higher, and in unusual circumstances for specific (and generally valid)
reasons, such as reassuring the public about aggressive efforts that
federal law enforcement is devoting to a known situation, or about the
public's own safety. 63 But the DOJ also has experienced the release of
information that is contrary to its general policies: individual prosecutors, or agents working under their supervision, deciding on their own
to provide information to individual reporters on terms that allow
them to use the information while protecting the sources' identities.
C.

Legal Ethics Rules

State court ethics rules, which are made applicable to federal attor-

neys by a new federal statute that took effect in 1999,14 seem not to
impose much additional constraint on prosecutors releasing nonpublic investigative information. American Bar Association Model
Rule of Professional Conduct ("Model Rule") 3.6, which is the basis
for most of the particular state court ethics rules that pertain to lawyer
62. See Levenson, supra note 7, at 564. Under the now-expired independent
counsel law, each independent counsel had full legal authority to determine on his
own that "public safety, interest or welfare" required him to disclose certain law enforcement information. The statute did not require an independent counsel to consult
with the Attorney General or even with a career official in the DOJ before making
this kind of determination. In addition, even after an independent counsel followed
through on his determination to disclose law enforcement information, the statute
gave the attorney general no remedy short of her ultimate, never-exercised power to
dismiss the independent counsel for cause. See generally Barrett, supra note 15, at 547
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994), which authorized the attorney general personally to dismiss an independent counsel "for cause").
63. The public statements that Attorney General Reno and other Department officials made about investigative efforts and developments in the days following the
bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City are one example. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Serrano & James Risen, Bombing Suspect In Custody: FBI Questions 2
Others as Death Toll Hits 65, L.A. Times, Apr. 22, 1995, at Al (reporting on Reno's
April 21, 1995 press conference where she announced the arrest of Timothy
McVeigh). Federal Bureau of Investigation official James K. Kallstrom's public
briefings and statements during the early investigation of the crash of TWA flight 800
are another example of the Department deciding, at the highest levels, to release
more investigative information than its ordinary policies might dictate. See generally
Joe Sexton, The Investigation: The First 36 Days: Behind a Calm Facade, Chaos,
Distrust, Valor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1996, at Al (quoting Kallstrom and describing
his close relationship with FBI Director Louis J. Freeh).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (Supp. 1999).
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speech outside of court, bars lawyers from speaking about investigations or litigation only when they "reasonably should know that it will
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter."6 Model Rule 3.8, which defines special responsibilities of prosecutors and thus supplements Model Rule 3.6,6 is
similarly directed to the adjudicative, not the investigative, stage of
law enforcement lawyering.6 It seems that, in the minds of prosecutors who contemplate disclosing investigative information prior to the
commencement of formal proceedings, the risk of prejudice to citizens
that is the focus of these rules does not rise to the level where it becomes a matter of the prosecutors' professional responsibility as lawyers not to release the information. Indeed, one confirmation that
prosecutors do not perceive these ethics rules as significant restraints
is the fact that the DOJ, in its recent efforts to effect the repeal of the
new statute that puts federal prosecutors under state ethics rules, has
made no claim that these particular rules affect how federal attorneys
must conduct themselves.68
D.

Media and Public Culture

The prosecutors and their supervisors who know that there are at
least some policy and professional restraints on their abilities to disclose law enforcement information do so today in a public culture that
strongly tempts government law enforcement personnel to talk about
their work. There are, obviously, an enormous number of media outlets and reporters. These media woo prosecutors and law enforcement agents because they have the content these media need, including crime stories, information about well-known or powerful persons,
and facts that can be connected to popular themes, such as negative
views of the government and public officials. Reporters also can offer
prosecutors and agents credible protection from identification, and
thus from consequences of being caught in the act of talking without

65. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(a) (1998).

66. See, eg., id. Rule 3.8(e) (directing prosecutors to "exercise reasonable care to
prevent investigators" and other colleagues in law enforcement "from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under
Rule 3.6").

67. See id. Rule 3.8(g) (directing prosecutors, "except for statements that are nec-

essary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and
that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, [to] refrain from making extrajudi-

cial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation
of the accused") (emphasis added).

68. See Testimony of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Before the

Senate Judiciary Committee, Mar. 24, 1999, available in the FDHC Congressional
Testimony on LEXIS; see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Jus-

tice"?, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J 607, 631-33 (1999) (explaining that "prevailing ethical
norms," as they apply in "the investigative context," allow "more leeway" to prosecutors than they do to other lawyers).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

lawful authorization from an appropriate supervisor9
For these would-be media sources in law enforcement, reporters'
requests for information, and the prospect of publicity about one's
work, are undeniably appealing. Telling the government's side of a
story, and/or rebutting the anti-government story that the government's adversaries often put out to the media without restraint or
honesty, makes sense in the effort to build support in investigative, jurisdictional, bureaucratic, budgetary, public opinion, and other battles.70 Press reports also provide pure ego gratification. Some prosecutors and agents are tempted, while working on the matter at hand,
also to think about their own prospects for advancement in law enforcement. They also may start to think about developing their future
job opportunities in the private sector, their political support, their
prospects for election or nomination to judicial office, and/or their
prospects for non-judicial elective office. As these thoughts occur,
some lawyers and agents surely come to conclude that talking to the
media is one way to build name-recognition and reputation and thus,
perhaps, to realize these ambitions.
E.

Unaccountable Government Speech About Law Enforcement
Matters Is Wrong

Our rules, weak though they are, and the strong statements that
public officials-including Attorney General Reno and thenIndependent Counsel Starrl-make regularly about the need for law
enforcement personnel not to speak about non-public matters, are
correct. Law enforcement wields enormous power over the individual. People's lives, jobs, relationships, privacy, and happiness are at
stake when the government commences an investigation, and they are
not easily restored after the government has disclosed information
about who it is investigating and what it is learning about them. As
former Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan famously asked after
he was prosecuted in state court by an elected District Attorney-not
in federal court by an independent counsel, as political and legal lore
69. Cf Independent Counsel Implosion, Editorial, Wash. Post, Mar. 13, 1999, at
A20 ("The subject of leaks is one on which we cannot comment dispassionately. Soliciting leaks, after all, is part of what a vibrant free press does. And it would be
rather hypocritical for an organization that thrives on such disclosures also to denounce them.").
70. Cf Neil A. Lewis, A Court Becomes a Model Of Conservative Pursuits, N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1999, at Al (noting that, during the writer's research regarding the
judges of and some of the recent decisions rendered by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, "[more than half of the... active judges were interviewed.., although most asked that they not be quoted directly or by name"). For
an interesting discussion of non-government lawyers using media in efforts to influence prosecutors, see Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of PublicOpinion, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1811, 1837-39 (1995).
71. See supra note 9.
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now misremembers this case--"Which office do I go to to get my
reputation back? "3
Government behavior-the choices we make as we exercise public
power-also makes fundamental statements about our values as a
general public, and about the values of the individuals who hold governmental positions of power. In criminal prosecution, the right values continue to include, in my view, what Attorney General Robert
Jackson described in his famous 1940 speech to DOJ personnel as "[a]

sensitiveness to fair play and sportsmanship," as "temper[ing] zeal
with human kindness," as "approach[ing the prosecutorial] task with
humility."7 4 On the specific issue of disclosing law enforcement information outside of court, Jackson recognized that law enforcement entities and personnel simply need to make their choices. The prosecutor "can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he
can have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled intimations.",, Or law enforcement can choose, based on a
6
principled view of its craft, to behave better than that:
III. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYERS
Although leaks are difficult to locate after the fact, they can be reduced hugely, if not prevented altogether, in any law enforcement organization. It simply takes law enforcement leadership that is willing
to make clear policy and then to demonstrate, by its own example in
following the policy and by its determined, even-handed enforcement
efforts that make examples of any violators, its seriousness in taking a
hard line against unaccountable disclosures of law enforcement information.?
72- See, eg., Father Andrew M. Greeley, Prosecutorsin America Are Out of Control, The Stuart NewslPort St. Lucie News, Dec. 19, 1998, at D3 ("If a special counsel
is appointed-even on the most flimsy grounds-the cost of your defense is $2 million
in addition to the harm done to your reputation and your family life. The costs go
even higher when you are indicted. As former Secretary of Labor Raymond Donovan said when he was acquitted in the 1980s, "Where do I go to get my reputation
back?").
73. Selwyn Raab, Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges By Jury in Bronx, N.Y.
Times, May 26, 1987, at Al (quoting Donovan's remarks in a courthouse corridor
following his acquittal on all ten counts after an eight-month trial: "The question is,
should this indictment have ever been brought? Which office do I go to to get my
reputation back? Who will reimburse my company for the economic jail it has been
in for two and a half years?").
74. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor(Address delivered at the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, Apr. 1, 1940), reprintedin 31 J. Am.
Inst. L. & Criminology 3,6 (1940).
75. Id. at 3.
76. See generally Green, supra note 68, at 619 (explaining that prosecutorial conduct implicates ethics both when this conduct is subject to legal rules adopted by
courts or other bodies that control lawyer conduct, and when prosecutorial conduct
involves what to do "in situations where the law offers a choice").
77. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 Harv. L
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For an Attorney General of the United States and her subordinate
officials in Main Justice, as well as for United States Attorneys and
any future independent counsel or special prosecutor, the key components of a principled and fair approach are the following policy components:
(1) Decisions to disclose law enforcement information should come
from the top, in response to requests for permission that have traveled
up the chain of command. United States Attorneys, other law enforcement component heads, and their supervisors in Main Justice
should decide, in an ascending hierarchy and, using the "public interest, safety or welfare" standard in the current Manual, when the DOJ
as an entity will disseminate information about any investigation or
prosecution.78
(2) Anonymity should end and accountability should begin. Law
enforcement policy should be to disseminate its information always,
and only, on the record. This policy would demonstrate law enforcement's substantive commitment to fair play and restraint in using the
powerful voice of the government. It also would demonstrate a justified, democratic confidence that law enforcement officials can describe their work for the public directly to the public. Finally, it would
permit law enforcement officials to be held accountable both for their
statements and for the substantive acts that on-the-record statements
can explain, thereby eliminating the "who said what" mysteries that
stem from the media protecting their sources and too often are the
end of today's leaks investigations.
(3) Top officials can and should share the responsibility for speaking publicly about enforcement matters with personnel who are most
expert in the particular matters being discussed. Top officials should
be encouraged, in other words, to invite other personnel to be present
with them and to participate when an authorized disclosure of information is made.
(4) When law enforcement officials choose to disclose information
in the public interest, they should do so generally. Information disclosures should be made through general press availabilities, not exclusive interviews. If some extraordinary circumstance requires an Attorney General or other authorized senior law enforcement official to
discuss non-public law enforcement matters in an exclusive interview,
Rev. 1521, 1545 (1981) ("Self-imposed limits on discretion may have greater force
than either their detractors or creators realize. As they acquire greater visibility, they
may become part of the popular climate and professional culture in which prosecutors
work. In the end, however, such limits are likely to be no stronger than the determination of the men and women who abide by them to limit their own discretion.").
78. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. This standard also could be
strengthened (1) by requiring affirmatively that any decision to disseminate law en-

forcement information must have a legitimate law enforcement purpose, and (2) by
stating that merely seeking to discredit a law enforcement critic or a subject of a law
enforcement investigation would not qualify as such a legitimate purpose.
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she should be required to explain that circumstance on the record
during the interview.
(5) Violations should have serious consequences. In this respect,
Independent Counsel Starr was exactly right: an improper disclosure
of law enforcement information should be, at minimum, "a firing offense."79
79. Starr's Letter to the President'sPersonalLawyer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1998, at
A9. In the letter, Starr states:
From the beginning, I have made the prohibition of leaks a principal priority
of the Office [of Independent Counsel]. It is a firing offense, as well as one
that leads to criminal prosecution. In the case of each allegation of improper
disclosure, we have thoroughly investigated the facts and reminded the staff
that leaks are utterly intolerable.
Id.
In rare instances, the DOJ has fired employees over unapproved information disclosures. In 1946, for example, Attorney General Tom C. Clark fired Oetje John
Rogge, the former Assistant Attorney General who had headed the Criminal Division
from 1939-1940, after he had returned to the Department as a Special Assistant Attorney General following World War II to investigate links between Germany's Nazi
government and groups and persons in the United States. See, e.g., Associated Press,
Gernan Plot to Defeat Roosevelt in 1940 Disclosed by Justice Aide, N.Y. Times, July
8,1946, at 1 (summarizing Rogge's interview with imprisoned Nazi Hermann Goering
and other evidence); United Press, Nazi Links to U.S. Found, N.Y. Times, June 2,
1946, at 5 (describing Rogge's investigations in Germany in spring 1946). In mid1946, Rogge had delivered a detailed report on his investigation to Clark, who had
declined to release it. Rogge responded by speaking publicly about his findings,
which led Clark promptly to fire him. See Associated Press, Clark Ousts Rogge for
Speech Linking Americans with Nazis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1946, at 1; see also David
Bird, 0. John Rogge, 77, Anti-Nazi Activist, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1981, at B14 (reporting, as part of Rogge's obituary, that his report to Attorney General Clark said
that 24 members of Congress either collaborated with or were used by a Nazi agent).
See generally 0. John Rogge, The Official German Report: Nazi Penetration, 19241942; Pan-Arabism, 1939-Today (1961) (including material from Rogge's September
1946 report to the DOJ). In 1999, a United States Attorney removed an Assistant
District Attorney who had been specially detailed to her office to be the lead prosecutor in the recent federal case against John A. Gotti because the Assistant had press
contacts that violated federal policy. See David M. Herszenhorn, Gotti Offered
Lighter Term As Setbacks Hamper U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1999, at B3 (reporting the
dismissal of Assistant District Attorney Vincent Heintz from the case).
In Starr's five years as independent counsel, there apparently was only one instance
of employee discipline. In March 1999, Starr announced that he was accepting the
resignation of his spokesman, attorney Charles G. Bakaly, III, and that Starr was referring a matter involving Mr. Bakaly to the DOJ for criminal investigation. See
Roberto Suro, StarrAide Resigns, May Face Prosecution: Justice Dept. Gets Referral
in Leaks Probe,Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1999, at Al; see also Office of the Independent
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, Press Release, Mar. 11, 1999 (visited Oct. 20, 1999), available on <http-//wwvw.oicstarr.com> (announcing that Starr had accepted, "with regret," Bakaly's resignation effective June 1, 1999; that Bakaly would be on paid administrative leave until that date; and that Starr's internal investigation concerning
possible unauthorized disclosures to the New York Times had been referred to the
DOJ). Although the facts of this ongoing and largely unpublicized matter were unclear to the public for months, it became somewhat clearer in September 1999 that
Starr's action against Mr. Bakaly related to a leaks investigation that the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") had conducted at Starr's request. See In re Sealed Case
No. 99-3091 (Office of the Independent Counsel Contempt Proceeding), 1999 WL
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In tandem with this policy, which should be explained with clarity

and emphasis to both law enforcement personnel and the media,w° the
DOJ, and any other special federal investigator or prosecutor who
comes into existence, should begin to disseminate its public information in a more uniform and comprehensive way. Every unsealed indictment and brief should promptly be posted on the Internet. Every
on-the-record media interview with a law enforcement employee
should be taped and posted for public retrieval. Top officials should
do more regular, appropriate, general briefing of the public and press.
The growing DOJ web site ' and Attorney General Reno's weekly
press availabilities 82 are good models of ways to make the work of federal law enforcement open and accountable to the press and the public.
CONCLUSION

idealistic.83

This proposal is
It requires integrity and character at the
highest levels of law enforcement. But we always have had that in
many high-ranking Main Justice officials, as well as in many United
States Attorneys and DOJ component heads.

Controlling unaccountable disclosures of information also requires
709977, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (per curiam). The FBI was investigating
whether any member of Starr's office had been a source for press reports during
President Clinton's impeachment trial that Starr believed he was constitutionally empowered to seek the criminal indictment of a sitting President. See Don Van Natta,
Jr., Starr Is Weighing Whether To Indict Sitting President: A ConstitutionalMatter,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1999, at Al. There has been no report that Starr ever disciplined
Mr. Bakaly before March 1999, or any other Office of Independent Counsel employee at any time, for providing information to a reporter.
80. See, e.g., Paul E. Coggins, Keep Your Investigations To Yourself, Legal Times,
May 19, 1997, at 32 (explaining his practice, while serving as United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Texas, of sponsoring an annual gathering for heads of investigative agencies and reporters to "discuss a wide range of issues ...including the
rules governing disclosure of information during an investigation").
81. See United States Dep't of Justice (visited Oct. 20, 1999) <http://
www.usdoj.gov>. The web sites that were created by the Office of Independent Counsel Donald C. Smaltz, see Office of Independent Counsel Donald C. Smaltz (visited
Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.oic.gov>, and by the Office of Independent Counsel Starr,
see Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr (visited Oct. 20, 1999)
<http://www.oicstarr. com>, are also excellent and appropriate methods of disseminating information to the public about important federal law enforcement efforts.
82. See infra note 83. Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox's news conferences during 1973 are another example of visible, and thus accountable, information
releases by a senior federal prosecutor. See James S. Doyle, Where Are the Stories Behind the Leaks?, Nieman Reports (visited June 23, 1998), available on <http://www.
nieman.harvard.edu>.
83. It is not, however, unrealistic. As recently as earlier this year, top DOJ officials apparently were considering policy changes in the area of contacts between Main
Justice officials and reporters. See Attorney General Janet Reno's Weekly Media
Availability, Apr. 8, 1999, at 10 (transcript available in FDCH Political Transcripts on
LEXIS); id., Apr. 1, 1999, at 11-12 (transcript availablein FDCH Political Transcripts
on LEXIS).
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some guts at the top levels of law enforcement, and guts may be less
abundant than are personal integrity and good character. My proposed hard line risks imbalanced reporting on matters of great public
interest, and it trusts reporters, at least to a degree, not to be captured
by the non-government sources who will continue to give them information in all of the current ways. It also would require the ugliness of
firing (or at least trying to find and fire) the first violators, to teach
truly the seriousness of this culture shift in federal law enforcement.
But it would be the right thing to do, which is the whole point, and
the luxury, of being a federal prosecutor. Those who need to be told
more than that will not understand it anyway."

84. Cf. Jackson, supra note 74, at 6 ("The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible to define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who
need to be told would not understand it anyway.").

Notes & Observations

